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The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: 
A Skeptical Note 
Ummad Mazhar  
Abstract: »Die Kolonialursprünge der vergleichenden Entwicklungsfor-
schung: Eine skeptische Anmerkung«. This note casts skepticism over various 
hypothesis formulated by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) in reach-
ing the conclusion that institutions cause economic development. I have identi-
fied four major issues in the study. It lacks adequate econometric specification 
and relies only on, what I termed, destiny variables. Secondly, the historical 
record does not support the author’s theory that mortality rate determine Euro-
peans strategy for institutions they intended to develop in the host country; 
thirdly, given current living standards and disease ridden environment in low 
and middle income countries, the claim that disease environment of early 19th 
century was neutral to economic development seems farfetched; finally, as-
suming that initial institutions caused present institutions put in question the 
developmental efforts of past half century and thus is more than a sweeping 
generalization. 
Keywords: economic development, economic history, comparison. 
 
In the context of economic development, institutions are taken to be the sets of 
rules governing the actions of individuals and organizations, and the interaction 
of all relevant parties and the negotiations among the participants (World De-
velopment Report, 1999/2000, page 2). In recent years, there is an increasing 
emphasis on the role of institutions in the economic performance of countries. 
In particular, the institutions that ensure private property (both intellectual and 
physical), open and free trade of goods and services, and freedom to business 
and investment are generally considered as enabling institutions for economic 
growth. The paper by Acemogly, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) (henceforth, 
AJR) makes an empirical investigation of the effect of institutions on economic 
performance. However, the paper lacks in some important respects and, as I 
will argue, exaggerates the role of institutions. The reasoning put forward is not 
persuasive due to many statistical, economical, and historical counter exam-
ples.  
In the following pages I would first summarize the main argument of AJR 
and then show the main weaknesses in their approach. A conclusion is given in 
the end. 
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1. Summarizing the Argument of AJR 
The principal hypothesis of AJR is that institutions cause economic perform-
ance. To infer causality from institutions to economic development authors 
assume the strategy of colonial rulers as the major determinant of initial institu-
tional structure of a country. The idea is that Europeans opted for a settlement 
strategy on the basis of their mortality rates in the host environment. Thus, 
greater mortality rates discourage them from long term settlement and they 
opted for extractive strategy i.e. plundering of the host countries resources for 
the benefit of mother country. Durable and effective institutions were set up in 
regions where they found greater feasibility for settlement. In empirical analy-
sis thus, the European mortality rate is taken as an exogenous predictor of the 
European settlement strategy vis-à-vis institutions, and this predictor is used to 
capture the variation in the present institutional setup due to this so called colo-
nial origin which in turn explains the present economic performance of a sam-
ple of countries. In a simple path diagram we can show it as follows: 
 
 
 
 
However each of the link in the above chain of reasoning is a multi-faceted 
hypothesis in itself. Before going into the details of this chain of reasoning it is 
appropriate to take a closer look at the econometric specification of the authors. 
Their second stage equation of the 2SLS estimator is: 
Rt=ζ+βlogMi+Xi'δ+ϑi 
where Ri is the current economic performance (i.e. log GDP per capita in pur-
chasing power parity dollars in 1995) and log of mortality rate M is used as an 
instrument for the institutional quality of the country. Authors take average 
protection against expropriation as a measure of the institutional quality. Xi
'  is a 
vector of other covariates, and ϑiis a random error term.  
2. Econometric Specification Issues 
Authors use instrumental variable 2SLS regression for causality analysis from 
institutions to economic performance. They use simple regression equation (i.e. 
only with one or two explanatory variables except in the robustness analysis, 
but more on it below) to prove their point that institutions cause economic 
performance. In their basic regression, using sole regressor which is the quality 
of institutions measured through protection against expropriation, results are 
valid. But this regression assumes away all the other determinants of economic 
development. In other words, it is assuming that economic performance takes-
   yields                      yields                                  yields                                         yields 
MortalitySettlementInitial InstitutionsCurrent InstitutionsEconomic Performance 
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place in isolation without any other factors determining its course. Applying 
this logic, it means that country A’s performance has nothing to do with the 
innovativeness of their labor, the man hour that they put in factories and offic-
es, the leadership that take decisions, and its external relations with the world. 
To the extent that these factors play their role, and it is difficult to say no both 
on theoretical and empirical basis, we cannot rule out the omitted variables 
bias.  
Table 1: AJR’s Regressors in Various Specifications 
Regression Economic variables Destiny variables Other variables 
Table 4  
Regressors 
Institutions 
Latitude, Asia dummy, 
Africa dummy, Other 
continent dummy 
 
Table 5  
Regressors 
  
British Colonial 
dummy, French 
Colonial dummy, 
French legal origin 
dummy 
Table 6  
Regressors 
 
Temperature, humidity, 
population with European 
decent (%), soil quality, 
Natural resources,  
landlocked, Ethno  
linguistic fragmentation 
 
Table 7  
Regressors 
 
Malaria, Life expectancy, 
Infant mortality 
 
 
Going beyond the basic regression issues, authors include other variables in 
their various specifications. However, one astonishing feature of the various 
specifications that authors employed in their analysis is the conspicuous ab-
sence of any long term determinant of economic performance like productivity 
growth, population growth, and human capital, as shown in Table 1. On the 
contrary, the major group of explanatory variables is destiny variables i.e. 
geographical and climatic variables. Given this scheme, one can never be sure 
that the causal relation, as concluded by the authors, would hold in a more 
generalized setting (due to omitted variable effects, see Stock and Watson, 
2007, chapter 6). To give an alternative, one can hypothesize, with reference to 
chain of causality I mentioned above, that European settlements were low in 
those countries because they faced stiff competition by other colonizers and 
also by the host populations, these conditions does not permit them long term 
settlement, and created political divisions and rifts in the host countries which 
resulted in the weakness of institutions at the time of independence. One can 
provide, as I will do to some minor extent below, evidence and data in favor of 
all these claims.  
Thirdly, even if we embrace the authors’ econometric specifications, we 
have to face very un-economic implications of this reasoning. For example, it 
 365 
implies that economic performance is determined by exogenous factors such as 
regional and geographical ones and the institutional set up whose existence too 
depend on climatic conditions that colonial rulers faced! In other words, this 
reasoning implies that poor economic performance is the fate and destiny of the 
poor nations rather than an outcome of economic factors! 
3. Settlement as a Function of Mortality Rate 
One weakness with the study is the data set that it has used for European mor-
tality. This data set is based on mortality rates of European soldiers in colonies 
and not the mortality rate of a representative European settler. Authors them-
selves aware of this weakness as they write (section III.B page. 1382):  
Curtin (1989), ‘Death by Migration’, deals primarily with the mortality of Eu-
ropean troops from 1817 to 1848. At this time modern medicine was still in its 
infancy, and the European militaries did not yet understand how to control 
malaria and yellow fever. These mortality rates can therefore be interpreted as 
reasonable estimates of settler mortality. 
The living conditions faced by a soldier are dramatically different from the 
ordinary person. For example, soldiers spend most of their time on field, travel-
ing from one base to another, and in battle fields. In sum, the large proportion 
of an active soldier’s life spent in outdoors. It is possible that soldier’s mortal-
ity rate is higher than the mortality rate of the ordinary Europeans in the same 
colony. If that is the case then the use of this instrument make the estimates 
biased. As this biased is upward, so it will invoke an upward biased in the 
parameter estimates of 2SLS regression equation I mentioned above.  
It left one wondering also on many other accounts. For example, if local 
people were immune to those diseases, as authors argued, then why did not 
Europeans also adopted their methods of keeping themselves safe from local 
diseases? Secondly, and more importantly, the colonizers were not going to 
live in the lands of Asia and Africa for the first time. There were European 
settlers in Asia, Africa, and Latin America well before the beginning of 17th 
century (the time period for which the mortality data, that authors’ used, is 
available). For example, as mentioned in the Philip’s Atlas of the World Histo-
ry (henceforth PAWH):  
Spanish exploitation of the Caribbean islands began with the settlement of 
Hispaniola in 1493, followed by that of Cuba and Puerto Rico. These islands 
provided a base for the exploration of Central America, and the failure of the 
Spanish to find a sea route to Asia encouraged further colonization and plund-
er. Mainland settlement began in 1509-10 on the isthmus of Panama. (p. 117). 
In the case of Asia, the record goes like that:  
Over the next hundred years [from 1498] a Portuguese ‘seaborne empire’ 
spread around the coasts of the Indian Ocean, moving ever further east and 
developing a chain of forts linking Ormuz, Goa, Cochin, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 
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Melaka, and Ternate. Japan was reached in 1542 and a settlement established 
in China, at Macau, in 1555. (p. 118).  
That was not the case that only Portuguese were settled down in India, but it is 
true for other European colonizers. Thus, Dutch established their East India 
Company in 1602, and first French settlement in India dated back to 1664.  
It is incomprehensible for a well-informed reader why authors exaggerated 
the Europeans lack of immunity against local diseases and local peoples im-
munity against them. On the contrary, a converse of this statement is supported 
from historical records mentioned in the PAWH page 114:  
the Spanish conquest of Central and South America from the end of the 15th 
century was accompanied by the decimation of the native Indian population__ 
not as a deliberate act of genocide but mainly as a result of diseases imported 
from Europe and a regime of forced labor. The estimated pre-conquest popu-
lation of about 57 million was reduced to less than 6 million by the late 16th 
century. A similar fate awaited the smaller North American population when 
European colonists began to arrive in the 17th century. 
This amounts to about 90 percent reduction in population!  
The above mentioned facts imply that European mortality rate was not the 
main determinant of the European settlements. Then what determines the Eu-
ropean preference for settlement? Although this questions is outside the scope 
of this note, but we can sneak ample evidence about some cogent determinants. 
To this end, consider first that in North America, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand the population density was far less than what it was in India, Africa 
and many other Asian and Latin American countries. And in some cases this 
already meager population in the former group of countries, was reduced by the 
dying away of locals either at the hands of their colonial masters or because of 
the diseases that they brought with them, as mentioned in the quote above. 
Further evidence is given by Robinson and Breasted (1921) in their authentic 
history of Europe, noting that at the beginning of 18th century, the North 
America was inhabited by just half million red Indians, while Indian subconti-
nent had a bustling populace of more than 200 million. For Canada, Robinson 
and Breasted wrote that  
when it came into the hands of the English during the Seven Years’ War, it 
was inhabited by some sixty-five thousand French colonists ... [During] the 
American Revolution many people from the United States fled to Canada, 
and, with the addition of immigrants from England, an English speaking popu-
lation has gradually been built-up, __ mostly outside of what is now the prov-
ince of Quebec,__ so that Canada now has eight million inhabitants. (p. 543).  
Thus, one can detect the regularity easily: higher population density areas were 
not considered appropriate for settlement by the Europeans and vise e versa.  
The density of population deter Europeans but what lures them to ‘Neo Eu-
ropes’? The Europeans who preferred to settle in so called Neo Europes were 
those trying to escape from either religious persecution or were enticed by the 
fortune that they expected from the new lands (mostly in the form of gold and 
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diamonds). For example, Atlas of the World History mentioned, “the division 
of the Church during the 16th century Reformation, between Catholic and 
Protestant believers, encouraged international rivalry and emigration to the 
New World.” (page 15). Similarly, for Australia, no European power has made 
any serious attempt to settle down until the discovery of gold in 1851 which 
caused a rush of immigrants to Australia (Robinson and Breasted 1921). 
4. Initial Institutions as a  
Function of European Settlement 
As I mentioned previously, institutions are extremely difficult to define. They 
range from as diverse phenomena as institution of marriage at an individual 
level to such encompassing phenomena as freedom to govern at social level. In 
a sweeping generalization, authors assume that protection against the expro-
priation is the most important for development.  
Authorsproxied institutions to mean protection of property rights against ex-
propriation which is not quite satisfactory for many reasons. First, it leaves one 
wondering about the implied type of property rights that are conducive to eco-
nomic development. Definition of property has changed since the colonial era. 
In most of the colonial era and even in the 19th century, the slaves were consi-
dered a part of one’s property. Even just before the French revolution, as Taine 
(1899) reports in his account of the economic conditions before revolution, the 
nobility and the king were the absolute owners of property and industry and 
commerce were also in their hands. Such excessive property rights lead even-
tually to revolution and destabilization of the polity. The point is that property 
rights are not always same. And at many occasions can prove destabilizing.  
Besides all the confusions related with the concept of institutions the histori-
cal evidence does not provide any support to the view that institutions cause 
good economic performance. Examples abound. An insightful account of Brit-
ain’s import substitution policy to established its woolen industry is provided 
by Chang (2007) to shatter the myth that UK’s economic developed was based 
on free market and free trade. In the same vain, Alexander Hamilton’s The 
Report on the subject of manufacturers that set the ideological stage for US 
industrialization recommended a heavy protection of domestic industries, the 
policy that is followed by all the presidents until the first quarter of 20th cen-
tury (Chang 2007 and 2010).  
If we take institutions as a government effectiveness and endearment of 
meritocracy, even then we cannot conclude anything. Because until 1870, 
appointments of high-ranking civil servants in Britain were made on the basis 
of patronage, rather than merit. The government chief whip (equivalent to the 
majority leader in the US Congress) was then actually called the patronage 
secretary of the Treasury, because distributing patronage was his main job. In 
the USA, the ‘spoils’ system, where public offices were allocated to the loyal-
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ists of the ruling party regardless of their professional qualifications, became 
entrenched in the early 19th century and was particularly rampant for a few 
decades after the Civil War. Not a single US federal bureaucrat was appointed 
through an open, competitive process until the 1883 Pendleton Act. But this 
was a period when the US was one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world. (Chang 2007, 148). 
Another determinant of institutional development that authors considered is 
democracy. Democracy is generally hailed as an institution that can provide a 
shield against discretionary expropriations. Perhaps, because of this Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson have used protection against expropriation as a measure 
of institutional quality, it appears appropriate to consider this important ingre-
dient of institutional black box. Defining democracy at the face value i.e. by the 
right to vote, we come to know that most of the today’s developed countries 
have adopted universal suffrage only after Second World War. Included in this 
list are Australia, Canada, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Switzerland, and the US. On the other hand many dictatorial regimes deliver 
best economic outcomes for their populace. For example, S Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, China, Brazil, Pakistan posted their best economic performances 
under dictatorships and not under democracy. 
5. Present Economic Performance as a Function of 
Initial (Colonial) Institutions 
This assumption encapsulates many assumptions in itself. To take most impor-
tant of them, it implies that effect of interventions on the systems in ex-
colonized countries after their independence, is insignificant. It means that all 
the policies and programs being undertaken in itself by the governments of 
those countries or at the behest of IMF or World Bank were unable to have any 
macroeconomic affect so much so that today’s economic performance is de-
termined, in a statistically significant way, by the legacy of colonial institu-
tions. Noting that a statistically significant relation implies that the joint distri-
bution of variables entangled in a statistical model follows some assumptions, 
notably invariance over the period (see Spinos 2007). One feels bewildered that 
the impact of initial institutions as captured by Europeans mortality rate re-
mains invariant over the decades.  
A closer look is really warranted to evaluate this farfetched reasoning. Au-
thors mentioned that two great causes of European mortality were Malaria and 
Yellow fever and that “these diseases were fatal to Europeans who had no 
immunity, they had limited effect on indigenous adults who had developed 
various types of immunities”. Therefore, these diseases are unlikely to be the 
reason why many countries in Africa and Asia are at a relatively lower level of 
development. In other words, greater immunity of 19th century inhabitants of 
ex-colonial countries against malaria and yellow fever implies that these dis-
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eases have no effect on their economic performance today. This claim appears 
at odds with World Health Organization’s World Malaria Report (2010). In 
2008, according to this report, mortality rate from malaria alone (i.e. deaths per 
100,000 population) was 58 among low income countries while it is zero in 
high income and 0.2 in middle income countries. While annual death toll from 
Malaria over 1991 to 2009 period in Africa is 70584 while in South East Asia it 
is 4073. These figures are in sharp contrast to European countries average 
death rate of only 3 deaths on annual basis over the same period. One really 
requires a strong conviction on institution’s impact on economic performance 
to agree with this assumption that such a disease environment has no effect on 
today’s economic performance in those countries.  
More importantly, the economic performance itself has not been invariant 
over the countries included in the sample of this study. To take just a broad 
category of African countries, they had respectable growth rates during 1950s 
and 1960s i.e. decades immediately after their independence. But their growth 
rates fall below 1 percent after 1980s. Similarly, the performances of Asian 
economies have diverse and variable patterns and cannot fall in line with the 
assumption of invariance as required by statistical specification (detailed analy-
sis of development record in developing and developed countries can be found 
in Chang 2007). 
Conclusion 
My principal disagreement with ARJ is the chain of reasoning they devised and 
its negative implications for the developing countries. Although econometric 
specification can be improved upon to strengthen the inference but it is less 
important than the crux of the argument itself. The role of institutions in the 
process of economic development is difficult to disentangle because of the 
many sided nature of institutions. To put it mildly, it is incomprehensible that 
while Europeans could not settle down in foreign environment but local people, 
despite of their centuries old customs and institutions, readily embraced the 
European practices and institutions and which, up to the present day, continue 
to bear on their institutional set up and economic development. Moreover, 
some institutions acquire importance and power only after a society crosses 
some specific threshold of economic development. In other words, the causality 
runs from the development to institutions, though in an encompassing phenom-
ena like economic development, the issue of causality is no less than the Holy 
Grail of our profession.  
Above all, to attribute the low income countries’ prevailing poor conditions 
to destiny variables rather than by taking responsibility for the policy mistakes 
and miscalculations, is not an appropriate scientific approach. 
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